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Trade and Invasive Species Risk Mitigation: 
Reconciling WTO Compliance with Maximising the 
Gains from Trade* 
 
 
This paper analyses the issue of balancing the gains from trade with the risk of pest and disease 
transference.  Two decision frameworks for determining whether or not to permit trade in a 
potentially invasive species -carrying good are presented.  The first considers only the potential 
production losses resulting from an invasive species entering through a trade pathway, as is 
prescribed by WTO compliance.  The second is a unilateral welfare-maximising approach which 
considers the consumer gains from trade, the loss of domestic producers’ market share and 
expected damage from the invasive species.  It is shown that these alternative decision 
frameworks can be reconciled such that they produce the same outcome regarding whether or 
not trade is to be permitted.  The key parameters which influence these decisions are also 
highlighted. 
 
Key words  Biosecurity, import risk analysis, invasive species 
                                                 
* We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on a previous version of this 
paper. 
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Introduction 
 
The role of economists in invasive species risk management strategies and trade is not 
yet clear, particularly in relation to risks to plant health.  An invasive species is one 
that if introduced will become established and inflict damage on the economy, natural 
environment and/or society1.  Before establishment takes place, a means of arriving in 
a new area is needed, and it is here that trade in plant (and animal) products is seen to 
play a role.  The significance of that role is a matter for debate.  Some studies assert a 
definite correlation between trade volume and the number of invasive species 
incursions (eg. Levine and D’Antonio (2003)), while others find no evidence of a 
definite relationship (eg. Lonsdale et al. (2001)).  Assuming there to be some positive 
relationship between trade volume and incursions, it would seem a relatively 
straightforward matter for a trading nation to use economic models to weigh up the 
benefits of trade with the increased risk of invasive species damage.  However, the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) does not require this of its Member nations when 
imposing quarantine measures.  Article 5 of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), which outlines relevant 
economic factors to be taken into account in assessing risk mitigation measures, only 
considers production risks to be relevant (GATT 1994).  Completely absent from the 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘invasive species’, ‘exotic pests’ and ‘pests and dis eases’ are used interchangeably.  In all 
instances it is to be assumed we refer to species that are capable of inflicting economic, environmental 
and/or socio-economic damage to a country or region if they gain entry and become established.  This 
paper concerns invasive species whose primary hosts are plants. 
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Article 5 is one of the fundamental drivers for trade, that of consumer benefit (Roberts 
1998). 
This paper looks at the information potentia lly provided by economic advisors on 
trade issues in two different decision contexts.  The first instance takes into 
consideration the rules and obligations governing Members of the WTO in 
international trade.  Under current WTO guidelines the decision of whether to import 
a potentially contaminated product depends on whether the perceived risk exceeds an 
acceptable standard known as the Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP).  The 
second situation assumes that instead of a WTO-compliance objective, there is a 
regulatory authority intent on maximising social-welfare in the home economy.  In 
this case a social welfare assessment would be undertaken which calculates the net 
effect of trade from resultant changes in producer and consumer surplus2.  Producer 
losses would stem from two sources: lower product prices induced by international 
competition and expected damage losses resulting from exotic pest and disease 
incursions (Roberts 2001).  Consumer gains would take the form of an increased 
volume available for consumption at cheaper prices as long as the landed price of 
imported product is below a closed economy price.  The aim of this paper is to show 
that these decision frameworks regarding whether or not to permit trade in a 
potentially invasive species-carrying good may in fact be complementary, and can be 
reconciled such that they produce the same outcome regarding permission to trade. 
                                                 
2 Producer surplus is defined as net revenue earned by a producer from the sale of a good at a price 
above the minimum acceptable price they would have been willing to sell for before having to leave the 
market.  Consumer surplus is the financial equivalent of the extra utility gained by consumers from 
purchasing a good at a price lower than what they were willing to pay for it. 
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The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides a background to the economics 
of quarantine risk evaluation, presented largely from an Australian perspective.  
Section 3 outlines the elements of an economic decision framework in the two 
contexts outlined above and shows how these alternative decision frameworks can be 
reconciled, as well as highlighting the key parameters in deciding whether or not to 
permit trade.  Section 4 discusses some of the unresolved complexities before Section 




In its current form, the SPS Agreement stipulates that any welfare effects resulting 
from trade in potentially-contaminated goods be measured in terms of producer 
welfare.  Paragraph 3, Article 5 of the SPS Agreement (GATT 1994) states: 
In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and determining the measure to be 
applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection from 
such risk, Members shall take into account as relevant economic factors:  the potential 
damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, establishment or 
spread of a pest or disease;  the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the 
importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to 
limiting risks. 
Article 5 also specifies that any restrictions placed on imported goods to reduce 
expected producer losses be justifiable by way of a risk analysis, and that the 
methodology used for this analysis draw upon internationally recognised 
methodologies. 
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As a WTO Member country, Australia can impose restrictions on an imported 
commodity and remain WTO-compliant if it carries out an Import Risk Analysis 
(IRA) that demonstrates that the contamination risk to domestic industries being 
protected against is sufficiently high to warrant the SPS measures imposed.  It can 
only restrict trade up to the point where the risk posed is ‘acceptable’.  Australian 
IRAs are the responsibility of Biosecurity Australia, and an acceptable risk is one that 
does not exceed the country’s ALOP.  The ALOP is a locus of arrival probabilities and 
incursion impacts with a unique product representing the maximum tolerable level of 
risk associated with imports before a refusal is made to a market entry request (Cook 
2002).  It is worth noting that for a number of reasons no country has to date 
articulated its ALOP (Henson 2001; Cook and Fraser 2002). 
The semi-quantitative IRA method used by Biosecurity Australia to determine the risk 
associated with imported products has recently been drawn into question.  In 2004 it 
was revealed errors in the IRA process for Philippine bananas (Biosecurity Australia 
2002) caused an underestimate of the potential risks associated with Moko Disease 
entering Australia by a factor of three (Biosecurity Australia 2004c).  Less than six 
months later a Federal Court ruled that another IRA concerning the import of pork 
(Biosecurity Australia 2004a) also contained errors relating to a disease threat, and 
that the subsequent allowance of pork imports from the US (subject to SPS measures) 
was based on unreasonable assessment (Australian Pork Ltd v Director of Animal & 
Plant Quarantine [2005])3.  These incidents, coupled with several long standing issues 
relating to the time taken to complete IRAs and communication with the States and 
                                                 
3 The judge in this case was critical of the IRA methodology used, particularly in relation to Post-
weaning Multisystemic Wasting Syndrome. 
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Territories in relation to area freedoms, have influenced the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) to establish the Australian Centre of 
Excellence for Risk Analysis in March 20064. 
The economic component of Australian IRAs completed in the last twenty years has 
differed significantly.  Typically, economic analyses of market access for imported 
products have tended to follow persistent requests from high-profile sources, 
focussing on specific quarantine decisions as opposed to the broader social welfare 
implications  of policy options (Nunn 2001; Roberts 2001).  The way in which the 
economic implications of imports have been estimated appears to have been done on a 
case by case basis, rather than using a standardised method.  This is true of both pre- 
and post-SPS Agreement analyses.  Case studies have used a variety of economic 
analyses, including those that simply assume an outbreak scenario only affecting 
producers, those that seek to put a probability on this occurrence, those considering 
both consumer and producer impacts, or combinations of these. 
Hinchy and Low (1990) addressed a New Zealand request made in 1989 to import 
apples into Australia, where the major disease transference concern was (and remains) 
                                                 
4 Although Nairn et al (1996) called for the formation of a centre for quarantine-related risk analysis, 
this recommendation was not acted upon in the initial governmental response to the review (Tanner and 
Nunn 1998). 
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fireblight 5.  Australia’s detailed response to this request, coordinated by the Australian 
Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS), was in line with the recommendations of 
the so-called ‘Lindsay Review’ of Australian quarantine in 1988 (DPIE 1988).  The 
economic component provided by Hinchy and Low (1990) was accompanied by a 
biological component, Roberts (1991)6.  The former took the form of a benefit cost 
analysis comparing the expected consumer and producer surplus changes resulting 
from relaxing quarantine laws protecting the apple industry.  In 1995 New Zealand 
made another request to access the Australian apple market.  This time the economic 
analysis came in the form of Bhati and Rees (1996), which was quite different in 
approach to that of Hinchy and Low (1990).  Expected consumer surplus change is 
not discussed.  The analysis only considers possible producer surplus losses to pome 
fruit growers if a fireblight outbreak were to occur 7.  Both import access requests 
were denied.  Viljoen et al. (1997) presents evidence that the import ban was indeed 
justified given that the pear industry in Australia could collapse in the event of a fire 
blight outbreak. 
                                                 
5 Fireblight is a disease caused by the bacteria Erwinia amylovora  that affects plants from the family 
Rosaceae, including apples and pears.  Once established the bacteria can not be eliminated from an 
orchard, but costly measures such as an aggressive pruning regime can be taken to limit the extent of 
infection (Buckner 1995).  The disease originated in the United States, but has spread to most apple 
growing areas of the world with the exception of Australia.  It was first discovered in New Zealand in 
1919, and apples have been refused entry to Australia since 1921(Biosecurity Australia 2004b). 
6 A theoretical discussion of the techniques used in this analysis appears in Hinchy and Fisher (1991). 
7 Like Hinchy and Low (1990), Bhati and Rees (1996) base their assumptions about the impact of the 
fire blight disease on the information contained in Roberts (1991). 
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A market access application concerning salmon products, again from New Zealand, 
was at the centre of an economic analysis conducted in 1991.  Salmon meat 
potentially provides an entry pathway for Whirling Disease8.  The AQIS response, 
McKelvie (1991), provides a scenario analysis and derives possible damage estimates 
from the introduction of whirling disease to three fisheries.  Neither the likelihood of 
disease arrival, the effect on domestic salmon consumers, nor the likelihood of 
scenario occurrence is discussed.  Following another request to access Australia’s 
salmon market in 1994, this time from Canada (which had been trying to gain access 
to this market since the mid-1970s), a similar economic analysis was prepared in 
McKelvie et al. (1994).  This analysis dealt with two salmon diseases considered an 
importation risk, Furunculosis and Infectious Haematopoietic Necrosis (IHN)9.  
Again, the analysis comprises of a gross estimate of producer surplus loss in the event 
of a disease incursion, rather than a net welfare assessment.  Once again, both of these 
requests were denied.  This prompted Canada to take the matter to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB).  In June 1998, the Panel released its report which found 
Australia's market access restrictions to be inconsistent with the WTO Agreement on 
                                                 
8 If left untreated Whirling Disease causes exhaustion, malnutrition and deformities in salmonids.  
Experience with the disease in Europe and the United States demonstrates that it is possible to manage 
its impact effectively by rearing fish in isolated, disease-free tanks before transferring them to ‘grow-
out’ facilities and (potentially) diseased waters  (McKelvie 1991).  Although effective, this is an 
expensive process. 
9 Furunculosis is a bacterial infection that affects most salmonid species (with the exception of Atlantic 
salmon) causing lesions that render fish unmarketable.  It is common in Canada, North America, the 
British Isles, Europe and Japan, and is easily transmitted by contact with contaminated water, 
equipment and infected fish  (McKelvie et al. 1994). 
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the SPS Agreement, and recommended that the DSB request Australia to bring its 
measures in to line with its obligations under the SPS Agreement (WTO 2000).  This 
ruling was unsuccessfully appealed by the Australian Government.  Further 
discussions between the two countries failed to find a mutually acceptable solution, 
freeing the way for Canada to take retaliatory actions against goods imported from 
Australia. 
Another trade issue which prompted an economic analysis concerned the importation 
of chicken meat from countries such as the United States, Denmark, Thailand and 
New Zealand.  The economic implications of imports from these countries were 
examined in Hafi et al. (1994), which used the example of Newcastle disease10 to 
illustrate the economic implications of relaxing quarantine protocols and allowing 
conditional access to the Australian chicken meat market.  The method used in this 
analysis is similar to that of Hinchy and Low (1990) in that a critical probability of 
disease arrival is determined which brings the benefits and probable costs of trade into 
balance.  Trade benefits were calculated as the change in consumer surplus resulting 
from lower domestic prices for chicken products, while the costs calculations were 
                                                 
10 Newcastle disease is caused by a virus known as avian paramyxovirus, and affects domestic fowls, 
turkeys, pheasants, pigeons, quail, guinea fowl and many species of wild and captive birds.  Symptoms 
of the disease are highly varied, but generally include loss of appetite, a decline in egg production, 
diarrhoea and a severe cough, and are usually followed by head tremors and wing paralysis, and 
eventual death.  The disease is easily spread through contact with diseased birds, carcasses and offal, 
and mortality rates can be between 10 and 100 percent in affected flocks in a very short space of time 
(24 to 72 hours) (Hafi et al. 1994).  A vaccination is available for the disease, which would add to the 
variable cost of production, but eradication is the current policy stance under the Australian Veterinary 
Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN)  (DPIE 1990). 
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based on a severe Newcastle disease outbreak scenario causing a contraction in 
domestic supply of close to 20 per cent. 
James and Anderson (1998) present an analysis of Australia’s ban on international 
banana imports based on a true social welfare analysis.  Consumer surplus losses 
resulting from import protection are compared to a hypothetical producer surplus loss 
induced by a relaxing of trade restrictions.  Here, the consumer gains are shown to 
outweigh production losses, casting doubt over the validity of the ban in terms of net 
social welfare.  Gains from the trade ban are more than likely outweighed by the cost 
to consumers.  The SPS Agreement is ignored in the sense that consumer gains are 
considered just as important as producer losses, and recognition is also given to the 
fact that a closed economy imposes costs.  Social welfare is therefore skewed in 
favour of producers at the starting point of the analysis. 
 
Alternative Decision Frameworks 
 
Assume initially, that in the absence of existing trade, Australia is confronted with the 
choice of whether or not to import a homogenous good from another country.  This 
good has the potential to act as a pathway for a harmful host-specific pest or disease 
that the source country has but Australia does not.  Further assume that in the absence 
of price- inflating SPS measures, the landed price of imported product ( **p ) is below 
that of a domestic equivalent ( 0p ), and that the domestic market is small relative to 
the rest of the world in terms of its influence on the world price.  The domestic market 
for the product is characterised by a downward sloping demand curve, )(qf , and an 
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upward sloping supply curve, )(qg .  This is situation and is depicted in Figure 1, the 
details of which are explained below. 
What factors should Australian trade regulators consider if they are social welfare 
maximisers?  Well that depends.  Two different evaluations of trade policy with 
respect to this “risky” import are considered below. 
 





If, as a WTO Member, Australia decides it is going to honour its obligations and 
strictly abide by the SPS Agreement it need only consider the potential effects of trade 
on its producers in terms of the threat posed by the pest or disease.  It would then act 
to minimise potential welfare loss with import restrictions or entry requirements. 
Formally, the domestic losses that could result from an exotic pest or disease outbreak 
resulting from contaminated imports can be estimated as the total expected change in 
producer surplus brought about by an incursion- induced (negative) supply shock, plus 
the cost of controlling the species (be it eradication or suppression).  The probability 
of arrival (r) is most likely an increasing function of the quantity of imported product, 
*q , and a decreasing function of the pre-border and border SPS measures the good is 
subjected to in the process of importation with cost t (i.e. ),( * tqr ).  To simplify the 
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effects of uncertainty, it is useful to assume a deterministic change in the probability 
of arrival with SPS compliant imports from abroad ( *r ) relative to the probability of 
arrival without imports (r) (i.e. rr >* ). 
As a starting point, a closed economy involves domestic producers with a supply 
schedule g(q) providing the total supply ( 0q ) to the domestic market at a price 0p .  If 
an incursion were to occur (despite there being no trade pathway) the supply curve 
will shift inwards to )(qh , and the new equilibrium price will rise to 1p  at which 1q  
will be demanded.  Note that even when no trade takes place 10 << r . 
If the market were to move from a closed to a quarantine-restricted trade situation the 
prevailing market price will fall to the world price ( **p ) plus t (i.e. tpp += ***  
where t is sufficiently low to ensure that *0 pp > ).  Domestic producers will remain 
suppliers to the domestic market as long as *p  remains above the minimum average 
variable cost of production, supplying a lower quantity 2q .  However, if trade takes 
place the likelihood of contaminated product reaching Australia via the trade pathway 
provided by 2
*
2 qq -  imports increases from r to 
*r .  In the event that a pest or disease 
incursion does result the supply curve will shift inwards to )(qh , further reducing the 
quantity supplied by domestic producers to 3q . 
Following an incursion, a co-ordinated control campaign is mounted against the 
invasive species to either eradicate it or restrict its abundance and distribution.  
Assume the total cost of control will depend only on the size of the outbreak upon 
detection (s) and the total reduction in abundance and distribution sought by the 
campaign (a), and is denoted ),( asc (Olson and Roy 2005).  Total control costs are 
assumed to be increasing in both a and s, while marginal control costs are increasing 
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in a and non-increasing in s. 
Faced with the prospect of biological contamination, biosecurity regulators in 
Australia need to decide if the risks associated with this particular organism are 
sufficiently low to justify importation.  Their decision rule relies on the following 
information.  Firstly, it relies on the Expected Impact of the invasive species if no 

















æ -= òò  (1) 
Equation 1 states that AEI  is equal to the expected difference between the producer 
surplus under autarky if no outbreak occurs and the producer surplus under autarky if 
an outbreak occurs, plus the expected cost of control. 
Secondly, the regulator needs to know the Expected Impact of the invasive species if 


















æ -= òò  (2) 
Equation 2 states that QEI  is the expected difference between the producer surplus 
with trade if SPS measures are 100 per cent effective and the producer surplus if an 
outbreak occurs, plus the expected cost of control. 
The final piece of information required is a maximum standard level of expected 
impact, or ALOP.  The decision of whether or not trade should be permitted is either: 
a) If ( ) 0<-- ALOPEIEI AQ , allow trade to occur, or 
b) If  ( ) 0>-- ALOPEIEI AQ , do not allow trade to occur. 
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Unilateral Welfare Maximisation 
 
The obvious omissions in the previous assessment are consumer surplus changes.  
The importation of potentially-contaminated goods brings with it consumer gains 
from trade with a lowering of prices.  Imports provide a greater quantity of the good 
to consumers at a lower price, *p .  It follows that a closed economy (or autarky) 
situation imposes costs to consumers and gains to domestic producers.  The decision 
of whether to import a commodity subject to SPS measures must be made relative to a 
closed economy situation to establish the consumer benefits achieved by permitting 
trade. 
Consider the effects on all consumers and producers of moving from a closed 
economy to a quarantine-restricted trade situation.  The prevailing market price would 
be expected to fall to *p  at which domestic producers are willing to supply 2q  of the 
total quantity demanded, *2q .  The total consumer surplus gained by allowing 



















æ -=D òò  (3) 
This change in consumer surplus is the difference between the post-quarantine trade 
consumer surplus and autarkic consumer surplus.  This gain comes at the cost of 
















æ -=D òò  (4) 
This producer surplus change is calculated as the difference between the autarkic 
producer surplus and post-trade producer surplus.  The resultant net gains, termed 
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traditional gains from trade in Snape and Orden (2001), are simply the difference 
between consumer surplus gain and producer surplus loss ignoring the possibility of 
an invasive species incursion.  That is, the traditional gains from trade here represent 
the change in producer and consumer surplus as a result of price differentials between 
the domestic equilibrium and landed price of imports: 
 PSCSGT D-D=  (5) 
This is represented as the shaded region in Figure 1.  These traditional trade effects do 
not take the increase in invasive species risk ( *EI ) brought about by trade in to 
account, which from Section 3.1 is given by: 
 AQ EIEIEI -=
*  (6) 
The total gains to consumers resulting from trade must be sufficient ly high to offset 
the expected losses to domestic producers for there to be a net gain from moving from 
a closed economy to a quarantine-restricted trade setting.  Combining the changes in 
consumer and producer surplus with the expected impact of an invasion on producers, 
the expected net gains from trade ( ENG ) can be stated as: 
 *EIGTNGE -=  (7) 
It follows that the decision of whether or not to import the potentially contaminated 
product is either: 
a) If 0* >- EIGT , allow trade to occur, or 
b) If 0* <- EIGT , do not allow trade to occur. 
 
Reconciliation 
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The exclusion of consumer interests in the decision of a WTO-compliant Australia to 
allow trade in a particular commodity does not necessarily lead to socially-
undesirable trade policies.  All depends on the size of the ALOP in relation to GT.  By 
using GT as a basis for the ALOP, the welfare of consumers can be embedded in the 
decision-making process despite the producer loss minimisation being the main 
motivation for policy makers. 
To see this, consider a trade decision involving a move from a closed economy to a 
quarantine restricted trade in a particular commodity.  Now assume that a regulatory 
authority setting the ALOP by which imported goods are assessed uses GT as a 
measure of what the standard should be: 
 PSCSALOPGT D-D==  (8) 
By setting the ALOP at the same level as GT and comparing it to an expected impact 
assessment (e.g. *EI ), the WTO-compliant regulatory authority would give exactly 
the same policy advice as a unilateral welfare maximising-economist.  Both are 
determining if 0>ENG  such that GTEI <
* , so the decision on whether or not to 
allow quarantine-restricted trade to take place or not produces the same outcome for 
both decision frameworks.  However, if the ALOP is set below GT then the WTO-
compliance decision rule will restrict trade more than the unilateral welfare 
maximisation rule (and vice versa). 
In addition to the standard roles of the magnitudes of the elasticities of demand and 
supply, one of the key drivers of equation 7 is the magnitude of the difference 
between the probabilities of arrival in a quarantine-restricted trade setting and in a 
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closed economy (i.e. rr -* ).  This is determined by the effectiveness of the 
quarantine-restriction measures and has a positive impact on *EI .  For example, if 
quarantine-restriction measures are relatively effective, then rr -*  will be small and 
*EI will be small, thereby encouraging quarantine-restricted trade. 
The cost of the quarantine-restriction measures (t) is also crucial in equation 7 given 
its role in determining GT (although it affects *EI  as well).  If it is the case that 
quarantine restrictions are relatively cheap (i.e. t is small), then GT will be relatively 
large and SPS-restricted trade will tend to be preferred. 
It follows that, compared with the standard gains-from-trade type of analysis, 
quarantine-restricted trade is most likely to be welfare-maximising in situations where 
both t and rr -*  are relatively small.  While trade is least likely to be welfare-
maximising in situations where quarantine restrictions are both expensive and 
relatively ineffective. 
 
Evaluating Quarantine Restrictions from a Position of Free Trade 
 
The previous analysis of quarantine-restricted trade has been undertaken with respect 
to an initial closed-economy position.  However the reconciliation of the WTO 
Compliance with the Unilateral Welfare Maximisation decision rules can alternatively 
be undertaken with respect to an initial position of free trade.11 
 
                                                 
11 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this to us. 
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To see this, consider Figure 2 where the domestic price is initially **p .  In the absence 
of an outbreak the introduction of quarantine-restricted trade would see the domestic 
price increasing to *p , resulting in a decrease in consumer surplus, but an increase in 
producer surplus.  Moreover, it can be seen from Figure 2 that the loss of consumer 
surplus more than outweighs the gain in producer surplus, resulting in the 
conventional loss of trade, LT.  This is represented by the shaded region of Figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE 
 
However, the new quarantine-restrictions will also reduce the probability of an 
outbreak, from **r  (for free trade) to *r , resulting in a reduction in the Expected 
Impact of the invasive species, and represented by: 
 QF EIEIEI -=
**  (9) 
where FEI  is Expected Impact in the position of free trade. 
Following the approach of the Reconciliation section, if LT is used as the basis for 
setting the ALOP, then for both decision rules quarantine-restric ted trade will be 
introduced if LTEI >**  and not introduced if LTEI <** . 
On this basis, for both decision rules quarantine restrictions would be introduced from 
a position of free trade only if the gains in terms of a reduction in the expected costs 
of an outbreak exceeded the losses in terms of a net trade loss of consumer over 
producer surplus. 
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Complexities 
 
Bilateral Net Benefit Maximisation 
 
If the welfare of trading partners were to be considered equally alongside that of the 
domestic economy another layer is added to the complexity of the decision to allow 
trade subject to quarantine measures.  Consider the market for the traded good in the 
overseas country.  The market clearing price is presumably below the price at which it 
supplies the Australian market.   When trade takes place the domestic price rises, 
causing the quantity demanded by foreign consumers to fall.  With demand now 
supplemented by Australian consumers, the total quantity of the good sold by foreign 
producers is greater. 
Foreign consumer surplus (CS ) is set to decline due to the price rise induced by re-
directing a proportion of supply to the Australian market.  But, this is more than offset 
by the rise in foreign producer surplus (PS ).  The traditional gains from trade for the 
foreign economy ( GT ) can therefore be stated as: 
 CSPSGT D-D= . (10) 
If these gains were to be considered by the importing country, in this case Australia, 
bilateral gains from trade ( BGT ) can then be determined as: 
 GTNGGT EB += . (11) 
As the importing country, the implication is that Australia would positively influence 
  21 
social welfare of the global economy by entering into quarantine-restricted trade as 
long as 0>BGT .  Even where 0<ENG  there may still be sufficient gains to be made 
in a trading partner’s economy to warrant the relaxation of import restrictions. 
Of course, the political reality is that the populations with which Australia trades do 
not pay taxes in Australia or vote in Australian elections.  But an objective economic 
analysis that includes the impact of trade policies on both economies may, at least to 
some extent, influence trade policy decisions, particularly when it is a developing 
nation making a market access request. 
 
The Appropriate Level of Protection 
 
The politically sensitive nature of quarantine issues goes some way to explaining the 
lack of ALOP definition across trading regions, particularly where human health is 
concerned.  Conventional neo-classical demand analysis for health care is often 
challenged by the view that health is such an important good that it can not be traded 
off against other goods that society consumes.  While it may not be the case that 
preferences for health are lexicographic, they are certainly high (Besley 1989).  To 
infer just how high society values such goods by way of an explicit policy statement 
concerning the ALOP is to court political disaster.  In the same way that an acceptable 
number of human fatalities resulting from zoonotic disease outbreaks can never be 
specified, policies also avoid stating the acceptable number of species extinctions, or 
degree of habitat loss.  Using the GT to bolster ALOP specification does not avoid 
these concerns, but merely provides a quantitative benchmark around which 
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deliberation and debate can take place.  The resulting decision on how to manage 
invasive species risks will rely on expert judgement. 
As a consequence the use of GT benchmarking could reveal non-uniformity in the 
application of risk standards.  Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement  prohibits the use of 
“arbitary or unjustifiable distinctions” in the levels of risk deemed appropriate across 
different commodities (GATT 1994).  However, consistency can be viewed as a long-
term goal for a biosecurity system, and to this end the approach developed in this 
paper could facilitate moves towards the consistency objective.  It is inevitable that 
from time to time WTO Members will alter their ALOPs in response to new 
information or technological changes (Gascoine 2001).  With no precise definition of 
an ALOP, Article 5.5 permits a degree of flexibility in the application of standards, 
and an ALOP is not necessarily expected to be applied with absolute consistency.  
Any differences should be non-arbitrary and justifiable, but it is not clear under what 
circumstances inconsistent treatment would be deemed WTO-legal (Gascoine 2001; 
Henson 2001). 
Perhaps more pressing than a lack of political will to express the ALOP using GT is 
the questionable reliability of producer and consumer surpluses as measures of social 
welfare.  While the impacts of a particular species extend ing to multiple industries 
poses no particular methodological problems (beyond determining the expected 
supply curve shifts in each industry), non-market impacts are far more complex.  The 
challenge associated with eliciting values for environmental flow-ons is well 
documented.  The tremendous growth in the literature following the Exxon Valdez 
disaster has been unprecedented (Adamowicz 2004).  However, significant though 
this body of work is, it is often of little use when attempting to quantify invasive 
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species impacts.  There are several reasons why this is the case. 
Firstly, environmental externalities often involve marginal changes in the population 
or health of an environmental resource, rather than its complete destruction.  Eliciting 
values for these marginal changes is yet to be attempted.  Secondly, the willingness of 
an economic agent to pay to protect an environmental good (or to guard against 
changes in its wellbeing) can not be explained without understanding the sociological 
elements involved in that agent’s decision-making process.  For instance, the income 
elasticities associated with environmental goods are thought to be large an positive, 
implying income has a significant influence on a person’s willingness to pay to 
protect the environment  (Whitby 2000).  Finally, non-use values for environmental 
amenities must be considered.  While an agent might not receive tangible benefits 
from knowing these amenities to be in a favourable state of health, they may 
nonetheless be willing to pay to gain utility from merely knowing this to be the case.  
This is particularly important when a change induced by an invasive species is 
irreversib le, or an affected ecosystem component is irreplaceable. 
Other complexities that concern the use of gains from trade in practical policy-making 
include equity issues, distributional issues, regional issues and political issues.  By 
effectively ‘benchmarking’ using consumer and producer surplus, the disproportional 
nature of policy impacts is not taken into consideration.  Hence, it must be 
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This paper has explored the use of economic analyses in trade and quarantine issues.  
Past examples in the literature have tended to follow high profile market access 
requests, but have not produce a consistent approach to revealing the benefits and 
costs of trade.  Compliance with the SPS Agreement requires that a country imposing 
import restriction on imported products be able to demonstrate that the risks of pest 
and disease contamination being prevented are legitimate using an internationally 
accepted standard, but one which only recognises production impacts of an outbreak 
as relevant economic factors.  However, it has been argued that an alternative 
approach which considers both consumer and producer welfare as relevant policy 
criteria may lead to more socially-desirable trade decisions. 
The aim of this paper has been to show that these alternative trade decision 
frameworks can be reconciled such that they produce the same outcome regarding 
whether or not trade is permitted.  It also highlighted the key role of two parameter 
values in influencing the decision regarding allowing quarantine-restricted trade: 
1) the costs associated with imposing quarantine restrictions on trade (which affect 
both the gains from trade and the expected impact of an outbreak), and; 
2) the differential risk of an outbreak associated with quarantine-restricted trade 
compared with no trade (which affects only the expected impact of an outbreak). 
It follows that quarantine-restricted trade is most likely to be welfare-maximising in 
situations where both the costs of imposing quarantine restrictions and the differential 
risk of an outbreak associated with allowing quarantine-restricted trade are relatively 
low.  While trade is least likely to be welfare-maximising in situations quarantine 
restrictions are both expensive and not very effective.  In terms of net social welfare, 
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it is important to consider these findings when deciding on appropriate invasive 
species risk management strategies. 
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Figure 1.  The quarantine-restricted trade decision from a closed economy position 
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Figure 2. The quarantine-restricted trade decision from a position of free trade 
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